From the office of the vice president of common sense: No.

Han Solo after reading Bless You Boys

 

Yes, this Rob Rogacki item is pure hit trollin’, but let’s play along:

No, Rob, we don’t want Jose Valverde back.

No, just. NO.

This problem is kinda a weird, reverse version of the argument the sabre guys use against closers: Valverde’s success, even in 2011 when he was “perfect,” is in large part due to the closer myth, and not as much based on pitching acumen as you’d like to believe.

The argument goes like this: a “closer” is a mythical position because any decent pitcher is going to have a decent chance of not getting any runs scored when they open an inning with nobody on base. Period. There are good arguments to be made that setup guys, who are often brought in with guys on base, are more valuable. This is why Billy Beane uses “whoever” in the role, and if that person becomes a star, they get shipped off (because their value is overestimated).

Jose Valverde was the poster child, in my view, for this effect. He got a nice contract from the Tigers due to his reputation as a good closer, though his stats have always been middling. It was a good signing, of course. He performed well for Detroit. But here is where we have to dispense with stats now, and use common sense:

Whatever Valverde’s numbers actually were last year (and they could NOT have been great), anyone who actually watched more than a few Tigers games last year (and I watched almost every single one that MLB.tv had, plus the national broadcasts, yes- I’m “that guy”) noticed that Valverde’s stuff just wasn’t great. Even when he was “fine,” that is, didn’t walk dudes, didn’t get in trouble, he looked *very* hittable. He quite simply was a different pitcher than 2010 and 2011. His fastball was a weak (for a closer), 92 mph flatliner that begged “hit me a mile!” and the splitter, his “movement” pitch that made his fastball (which used to sometimes hit 97!) effective just flat out disappeared from this arsenal.

In fact, the surprise of 2012 for me was that Valverde didn’t combust faster. In fact, I think all things considered he had a fine season… but it was time to go.

And, again, to Rogacki’s good argument that Phil Coke‘s stats stunk yet a few playoff wins has us forgetting that, well, again, there is the “eye” test here as well: did anyone think that Coke didn’t have decent stuff? I’m not sure that was the reason. He wasn’t hitting his spots. His control faltered. But the stuff seemed like it was there. Coke is younger too, and it didn’t seem like, again, to my eye, like he was regressing.

One would think, me, being a kind of “half and half” sabre and traditional guy that I would be pleased that Tiger blogdom is kind half freaking about about the Tigers, organizationally, going “full sabre” on the closer deal. But the closer stuff is one area were I happen to agree with the advanced metrics crowd 100%. I think the playoffs proved it: they picked a dude, Coke, he could have failed, but you know what Coke did before he closed? HE CAME INTO GAMES WITH MEN ON $%#@#%#@$#@ BASE. Way way way harder than bases empty situations. So was it any surprise he did better in what we should consider an easier situation?

Anyway, I should mention before I close that I loved Valverde when he was on: trolling opponents is great fun and he did that better than most. But it was time to go, and Bruce Rondon’s stuff is awesome. I agree with the Tiger’s strategy of taking a chance on awesome.

2 thoughts on “From the office of the vice president of common sense: No.

  1. Since we’re playing along…

    According to PitchFX, Valverde’s fastball averaged 93.3 mph last season, while his splitter averaged 84.2 mph. In 2011, those numbers were 93.8 mph and 85.9 mph, respectively. While you could make the argument that these deviations are why Valverde was more hittable in 2012, I think it has more to do with the movement (or lack of) on his pitches. The PitchFX data (links below) show that the difference in movement between the fastball and splitter was much smaller in 2012 than it was in 2011. Valverde wasn’t able to change hitters’ eye levels, and he paid for it.

    2011 data: http://pitchfx.texasleaguers.com/pitcher/407878/?batters=A&count=AA&pitches=AA&from=3%2F1%2F2011&to=1%2F1%2F2012#pitchresults

    2012 data: http://pitchfx.texasleaguers.com/pitcher/407878/

    As for your opinion on the closer-by-committee approach, I think it’s a great idea in theory that doesn’t work as well in practice. Relief pitchers want defined roles so that they know when to start their warmup routines, allowing themselves to prepare both physically and mentally to enter the game. If a guy pitches in the 6th inning one day then is asked to pitch the 9th the next day, there might be some disastrous consequences. We don’t really know whether this is the case though, because nobody truly does this. Even Billy Beane’s Oakland A’s relied heavily on Grant Balfour to close out games last year (though he did lose his job for a couple months after blowing a couple of saves in early May). Don’t get me wrong: I truly believe that the closer role is overrated, despite what my original post suggests. I didn’t suggest bringing back Valverde because he’s the established closer that the team may or may not need, I suggested bringing him back because he would be cheap and would provide some competition for the role.

    One thing I definitely think we would agree on is a reluctance to pay big money for the closer position. While I think the Valverde signing was a success overall, he costed a lot of money that could have been better spent over the past few years. I like that the organization is trying to shore up the bullpen on the cheap (though I would have liked to see another lefty like Sean Burnett or J.P. Howell brought in on a $2-3 million deal) instead of paying big money for a closer (have fun, Washington).

    Great post, and thanks for reading.

Leave a comment